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ARE WE FREE TO BREAK THE LAWS OF
PROVIDENCE?
Kenneth L. Pearce

Can I be free to perform an action if God has decided to ensure that I do not
choose that action? I show that Molinists and simple foreknowledge theorists are committed to answering in the affirmative. This is problematic for
their status as theological incompatibilists. I suggest that strategies for preserving their theological incompatibilism in light of this result should be
based on sourcehood. However, the path is not easy here either, since Leibniz
has shown how theological determinists can offer an extremely robust form
of sourcehood. Proponents of these views must identify a valuable form of
sourcehood their theories allow that Leibniz’s theory doesn’t.

Theological determinism is the view that God exercises total control over all
contingent truths, including truths about the choices and actions of creatures. Theological compatibilism is the thesis that theological determinism is
compatible with the existence of free creatures. Theological compatibilism
implies, in particular, that creatures may be free even if God controls their
choices.1 In recent analytic philosophy of religion, theological compatibilism has not been a popular view: theistic philosophers have mostly held
that the sort of freedom actually possessed by humans is incompatible
with divine determination.2 Some of these philosophers, known as open
theists, have gone so far as to reject divine foreknowledge and affirm that
divine providence is “risky”—that is, that it is not absolutely certain (but
only highly probable) that history will turn out as God intends.3 For those
theists who wish to reject the extremes of theological compatibilism and
open theism, there are two well-known options: Molinism and simple foreknowledge. According to Molinism, God possesses and makes providential
use of comprehensive knowledge of what creatures would freely choose

1
This use of the term “theological compatibilism,” in debates about divine providence,
should be distinguished from the use of the term in the context of theories of divine omniscience, where it designates the view that creatures may be free although God has foreknowledge of all their choices and actions.
2
But for a dissenting view, see McCann, Creation and the Sovereignty of God.
3
Hasker, Providence, Evil and the Openness of God.
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in any possible situation, but God has no control over the facts about what
free creatures would choose. According to the simple foreknowledge theory, God possesses simple (i.e., non-inferential) knowledge of the actual
future, but not the kind of counterfactual knowledge supposed by the
Molinist. Further, according to the simple foreknowledge theory, the use
of such foreknowledge meaningfully augments God’s providential control.4 Although the simple foreknowledge theory is supposed to yield a
stronger form of providential control than open theism, it denies that God
can control the free actions of creatures.
In this paper, I argue that both Molinism and the simple foreknowledge
theory are committed to the claim that creatures may be free to break the
laws of providence—that is, that a creature may sometimes be free with
respect to an action although God has decided to ensure that that creature will not choose that action. This amounts to an admission of what
we might call local theological compatibilism, the view that a particular
creaturely choice may be free although God exercises control over which
option the creature chooses. If, however, a particular creaturely choice can
be free although controlled by God, why think that (global) theological
determinism is incompatible with creaturely freedom?5 This question may
have an answer, but it is not an obvious one. Providing such an answer
is a matter of some urgency for philosophers seeking a middle ground
between theological compatibilism and open theism.
In §1, I introduce the concept of a prevented option, which will be central to
my argument. A prevented option is a course of action that is among a creature’s options although God has decided to ensure that that creature does not
choose it. In §2, I argue that if Molinism is true then prevented options are
widespread and, indeed, it is epistemically possible that all unchosen options
are prevented options. In §3, I argue that prevented options are also possible
on the simple foreknowledge view. In §4, I argue that proponents of these
theories of providence are committed to the claim that we are free to choose
prevented options, and hence free to break the laws of providence. I conclude, in §5, with a brief discussion of the prospects for restoring the middle
ground between theological compatibilism and open theism by endorsing
an account of free will based on sourcehood, rather than alternative possibilities. I suggest that such a view, though promising, has significant obstacles
to overcome, since Leibniz has shown how theological determinism can be
rendered compatible with an extremely robust form of sourcehood.
4
Because I am here concerned with the simple foreknowledge theory as a theory of providence, I treat it as an account of what knowledge God uses providentially, rather than an
account of what knowledge God possesses. Donald Smith (“On Zimmerman’s ‘Providential
Usefulness’”) has argued that there may be adequate reason to attribute simple knowledge
of the future to God even if God cannot make providential use of such knowledge. This,
however, does not amount to a simple foreknowledge theory of providence. For present purposes I count this kind of view as a version of open theism.
5
I thank an anonymous referee for emphasizing the importance of the distinction between
(what I now call) local and global theological determinism here.
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1. Prevented Options
Debates about free will standardly employ the notions of power or ability to
do otherwise. However, the analysis of the ordinary notion of power or ability has proven difficult.6 My strategy here will be to avoid these notions as
much as possible, and instead rely on a stipulative notion of having an option.
I say that an action or a state of affairs is among an agent’s options if and only
if: (a) the agent takes reasons for and/or against that action or state of affairs
into account in the course of making a choice, and (b) whether the action is
performed or the state of affairs obtains depends on the agent’s choice.
I assume that having an action among one’s options is necessary, though
perhaps insufficient, for being free with respect to that action. I speak of an
agent being free with respect to an action, rather than free to perform an action,
in order to remain neutral on the question of whether freedom of will should
be distinguished from freedom of action. For those who draw such a distinction, being free to perform an action is clearly freedom of action and not freedom of will. They should interpret my locution “free with respect to an action”
to mean something like “free in choosing whether to perform an action.”
It may be objected to condition (a) that there are many actions with respect
to which we are free but which we never consider. Such actions can be divided
into two sets of cases. Sometimes we don’t consider performing an action
because the action is unthinkable for us (e.g., murdering a stranger at random),
or because the action is obviously bad (e.g., betting the entire contents of my
bank account at the racetrack), or because it is simply silly (e.g., trying to stand
on my head during a lecture). In these cases, we implicitly regard the reasons
against the action as decisive, and hence the reasons against it can be said to be
taken into account. In other cases, the reason I don’t perform the action is that
I never thought of performing it. Perhaps I have no opinion, even implicitly,
about whether the action is good or bad, or perhaps I implicitly regard it as
good but haven’t thought of performing it on this particular occasion. In such
cases, I maintain, I am not free with respect to the action (although I would be
free with respect to it if I thought of it). Ignorance of (or inattentiveness to) the
available alternatives and their consequences detracts from one’s control over
a situation and is for this reason an impairment of freedom.7
The notion of dependence in condition (b) is rather murky. Simple
counterfactual dependence will not work here due to the possibility of
redundancy8 and finkishness (of which more later). I suggest we employ a
notion of explanatory dependence, of which causal dependence is probably the
relevant species for humans.9 That is, supposing I do in fact raise my hand,
In other work, I have argued that this is because the ordinary notion has an unmanageable number of dimensions of vagueness. See Pearce, “Infinite Power.”
7
See Pearce, “Infinite Power.”
8
See Paul and Hall, Causation, ch. 3.
9
In other work, I argue that God’s act of will is a ground, rather than a cause, of its fulfilment (Pearce, “Counterpossible Dependence”; Pearce, “Foundational Grounding”).
Formulating the definition in terms of explanation allows for the possibility of agents (such
as God) whose choices might explain outcomes in non-causal ways.
6
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the dependence condition is satisfied if my raising my hand is explained
by my choice to raise my hand.10 Supposing I don’t raise my hand, condition (b) is satisfied if my not raising my hand is explained by my not
choosing to raise my hand. Although counterfactual dependence fails as
an analysis, it can be employed as a heuristic here, since these kinds of
explanatory dependencies normally (in the absence of redundancy, finkishness, etc.) give rise to counterfactual dependence.
A prevented option is an action or state of affairs such that it is among a
created agent’s options although it is part of God’s providential plan to
ensure that the agent does not choose it. It might be regarded as obvious
that only on theological compatibilism is God able to ensure that a created agent chooses in a particular way without taking away the agent’s
options. However, I will now show that both Molinism and the simple
foreknowledge theory allow for this.
2. Molinism and Prevented Options
A counterfactual of creaturely freedom (CCF) is a subjunctive conditional
about what a possible creature would choose if faced with a certain free
choice. Molinism is the view that CCFs are contingent, but nevertheless
independent of God’s will, and that God employs comprehensive knowledge of CCFs in deciding what to create.
Molinism promises to combine a strong doctrine of providence, on
which every detail of history goes according to God’s plan, with a libertarian conception of free will, on which God cannot determine the free
choices of creatures.11 This is possible, on the Molinist view, because of
the way the CCFs are employed in God’s providential plan. Since God
cannot determine the free choices of creatures, God has no choice about
the truth values of the CCFs. However, God knows these truth values, and
God has significant control over the circumstances in which free beings
find themselves. The worlds consistent with the actual truth values of the
CCFs are known as feasible worlds. According to the Molinist, God determines exactly which one among the feasible worlds is actual.12
The presence of prevented options is thus central to the Molinist picture: God puts certain choices before us in the full knowledge of which
10
Because of worries about deviant explanatory chains we should perhaps add, “in the
way human choices normally explain human actions.” This qualification can be harmlessly
neglected for present purposes, since our discussion will always assume that the choice leads
to the action in the normal way.
11
In his book Divine Providence, Thomas Flint treats this as the primary motivation for
Molinism, and in a later work (“Divine Providence”) he simply defines “Molinism” as the
conjunction of strong providence with libertarianism about free will. That Molinism’s (purported) ability to combine theological libertarianism with strong providence is its chief selling point is widely accepted among both friends and foes. See, e.g, Perszyk, “Molinism and
Compatibilism,” §2; Zimmerman, “Yet Another Anti-Molinist Argument,” 33–38.
12
Flint, Divine Providence, §2.5; Perszyk, “Molinism and Compatibilism,” 13–14, 19;
Perszyk, “Molinism and the Consequence Argument,” 134–135.
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option will be chosen. It is not clear whether this always amounts to God’s
ensuring that the other option is not chosen. Perhaps God would still have
placed the creature in the relevant circumstances if the creature had been
going to make a different choice.13 However, God’s providential employment of CCFs must generate at least some prevented options.
To see this, we begin with a concrete example. Thomas Flint has argued
that Molinism allows for a compelling defense of the Catholic doctrine
of papal infallibility.14 According to this doctrine, as Flint understands
it, God is committed to ensuring that no pope, speaking ex cathedra, says
what is false, yet a pope is just as free as anyone else to say whatever
words he chooses whenever he chooses15 This view is consistent, according to Molinism, because God is able to ensure that only those who, in
the relevant circumstances,16 will freely refrain from speaking falsely will
become Pope.
On such a view, does a pope still have the option of speaking falsely?
Condition (a) is clearly satisfied: Popes, just like anyone else, weigh the
reasons for and against uttering certain words.
Condition (b), however, is much more complex. If God has really left
the Pope free to speak as he sees fit, then the conditional if the Pope chose to
say that greed is a virtue, he would say that greed is a virtue should be true, and
this suggests that the dependency required by condition (b) also exists:
the Pope does not say that greed is a virtue because he does not choose
to say this. However, since it is part of God’s providential plan to ensure
that the Pope does not say what is false, it appears that the following backtracking conditional is also true: if Francis had been going to say that greed
is a virtue he would never have become Pope.17 (“Francis” is here used as a
proper name of the current Pope, despite the fact that if he had not been
Pope he would not have been called “Francis.”) These two conditionals
13
Flint remarks in passing, “surely there are some divine decisions (the decision to create Alpha Centauri might be a good candidate) which are counterfactually independent of
our decisions and actions” (Divine Providence, 167). Perhaps. But I will argue below that the
Molinist has no right to be sure about this.
14
Flint, Divine Providence, ch. 8. Flint also offers a structurally similar defense of the
Incarnation, but the issues there are far more complex. See Flint, “‘A Death He Freely
Accepted.’”
15
Flint, Divine Providence, §§8.2–8.3. I employ this only as an illustrative example. The
questions of whether Flint’s interpretation of the Catholic doctrine is correct and whether
the Catholic doctrine (correctly interpreted) is true are far beyond the scope of this paper.
Jeremy Pierce pointed out to me that many Christians who reject papal infallibility nevertheless face a precisely analogous problem concerning the writers of Scripture. If (as many
Christians believe) the writers of Scripture were inspired in such a way as to be literally
infallible—without the possibility of error—at the time they were writing, could they also
be free to write whatever they chose? Flint makes a similar suggestion in passing (Divine
Providence, 180).
16
For simplicity in what follows I will often neglect this qualification.
17
In fact, Flint (Divine Providence, ch. 11) argues at some length that Molinism does generate backtracking conditionals whereby we may have what Flint calls “strong counterfactual
power” over the past.
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may appear inconsistent, or the second conditional might be thought to
undermine the dependency relation, so that the outcome really depends
not on Francis but on God.
However, properly interpreted, on the assumption that Molinism is
correct, these two conditionals can both be true,18 and condition (b) can be
satisfied. The confusion is due to the fact that (on Flint’s package of views)
Popes are subject to a curious condition we will call finkish backtracking.
A finkish power, disposition, or ability is one that would be lost if the
conditions for its exercise ever occurred.19 If God exists, then cases are easy
to construct. Just suppose that God has decided to preserve a certain vase
from breakage by miraculous intervention if necessary: if ever the vase is
about to break God will intervene to alter the vase so that it will be strong
enough to remain intact. The intuition is supposed to be that, since this
vase is intrinsically just like all the other fragile vases in the world, it too is
fragile. Nevertheless, if it were dropped it would not break (because God
would miraculously preserve it).
If Molinism is true, however, then God needn’t miraculously intervene
to preserve the vase. God can instead simply create the vase in circumstances where God knows it won’t be struck or dropped. If Sally is such
that, were she left unattended with the vase, she would hit it with a baseball bat, then God can make sure to create Sally in other circumstances or
not create her at all.
If the preservation of the vase is sufficiently important to God, then
(depending on God’s larger plan) it might be true that if the vase had been
going to be dropped (struck, etc.) it would not have been fragile. This is what
I mean by “finkish backtracking”: if the conditions for the exercise of the
disposition (power, ability, etc.) had been going to be actual, then the
object would not have had that disposition (etc.).
Intuitively, though, it seems that, standing inside the world where the
vase does exist and is constituted just like any other fragile vase, and
God does not intend to perform a miracle, it is true that if Sally struck
the vase with a baseball bat it would break.20 In other words, finkish backtracking does not generate ordinary (forward-looking) finkishness. This
intuition is borne out by existing theories of counterfactuals, which generally severely limit the conditions in which backtracking is permitted.21 If
18
John Martin Fischer (The Metaphysics of Free Will, ch. 5) has argued, on somewhat different grounds, that “can” claims and backtracking conditionals can come apart in a fashion
similar to that under discussion here.
19
See Martin, “Dispositions and Conditionals”; Lewis, “Finkish Dispositions”; Vihvelin,
Causes, Laws, and Free Will, §6.3.
20
Linda Zagzebski (Freedom and Foreknowledge, 100–106, 137) argues that backtracking
conditionals can be true only when evaluated from a “detached, nondeliberative perspective” (106). I have something similar in mind when I say that “standing inside the world” the
disposition ascriptions and associated counterfactuals remain true: the backtracking conditional is true only from the perspective of God’s creative decision and not from the deliberative perspective of any finite agent.
21
Lewis, “Counterfactual Dependence”; Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, ch. 18.
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a speaker wants a conditional to be interpreted in a backtracking way, he
usually has to indicate this explicitly with odd grammatical constructions
like “had been going to” in English.22
In fact, if this type of backtracking were allowed in the evaluation of
ordinary conditionals, disaster would ensue for the Molinist. Consider,
for instance, the version of Molinism on which, necessarily, God actualizes
the best feasible world—that is, the best world consistent with the actual
(contingent) truth-values of the CCFs.23 Presumably there are very many
worlds that are very similar in value, many of which differ in their populations. Further, small differences in our actions can have ripple effects
on the choices, actions, and circumstances of others that could make
surprising differences to the overall value of a world. As Flint observes,
“Molinists . . . are in no position to deny the possibility of bizarre counterfactual connections.”24
Consider, then, the collection of worlds at which Earth is populated by
humans and the collection of worlds at which it is instead populated by
hobbits. (Suppose there is some good reason not to create both on earth
together.) Humans and hobbits each have their distinctive charms, but
each also (we may suppose) have their distinctive tendencies to evil. Thus,
assuming (as the view under consideration does) that human worlds and
hobbit worlds are commensurable,25 it seems likely that the difference in
value between the best human world and the best hobbit world is not
very large. Now consider the unlimited variety of creatures God could
have created, only a small fraction of which are even conceivable by us.
If (as the view under consideration supposes) the actual world is the best
feasible world, probably it is so only by a very small margin, and the
close competitors probably include not only other human worlds but also
hobbit worlds and worlds so alien as to be inconceivable by us. But any
change in the CCFs (whether regarding actual or merely possible creatures) would alter which worlds are feasible,26 and this could easily result
in a radically different world being best.
Which kind of world wins out thus seems likely to be highly sensitive to
small changes in the CCFs. As a result, on this brand of Molinism, it might
22
Lewis, “Counterfactual Dependence,” 457–58; Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to
Conditionals, §108.
23
I don’t know of any Molinist who explicitly endorses this view, but Justin Mooney, “Best
Feasible Worlds,” discusses some reasons why the view might be attractive to at least some
Molinists. Most discussions of Molinism are neutral on this question.
24
Flint, Divine Providence, 248.
25
For an argument that differences in population (among other things) generate widespread incommensurability among worlds, see Pruss, “Divine Creative Freedom.”
26
Flint (Divine Providence, 6), following Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity, §4.1), takes
possible worlds to be maximal states of affairs. Since these include counterfactual states of
affairs, any change in the CCFs actually generates a non-overlapping collection of feasible
worlds (or “world-type,” as Flint says), even if the change involves only non-actual creatures. Presumably, however, worlds that differ only in CCFs about non-actual creatures do
not differ in value.
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well be true that if I had not been going to write this paper, I would not exist,
and perhaps even if I had not been going to write this paper, there would not
have been any humans. To suggest that this is an epistemic possibility is not
to overestimate the value of this paper. It is simply to note that we do not
know precisely how my writing of this paper fits into the total structure of
the world God has chosen, and we also don’t know much about the close
competitors to this world, hence we don’t know whether small changes in
the CCFs might push some completely different kind of world—perhaps
a hobbit world—over the top. Indeed, even less momentous differences
like what I was going to eat for breakfast today might make this kind of
difference, according to this brand of Molinism.
Suppose, however, that the Molinist does not hold that there must be
a unique best feasible world and God must choose it. (I suspect that most
Molinists do not hold this.27) Then the results may be rather different,
depending on the Molinist’s understanding of divine choice. However,
the Molinist by definition holds that God takes the CCFs into account in
God’s creative choice, and this would be pointless if God’s choice were not
in some way or to some degree sensitive to the CCFs. Thus the Molinist is
certainly committed to holding that it is sometimes true that if a creature had
been going to choose differently God would have made a different creative
choice.28 In the absence of some kind of model of divine decision-making,
the Molinist cannot rule out the possibility that any difference in the CCFs,
however trivial, would have led God to choose a radically different world
with a non-overlapping population.29 Furthermore, in light of the enormous array of choices available to God and the diversity of reasons for
and against these choices, it seems unlikely that God has any particularly
27
Flint (“The Problem of Divine Freedom”) in fact argues that necessarily there is not a
unique best feasible world.
28
Plantinga (“On Ockham’s Way Out,” 254–258) argues that any view on which God can
make providential use of foreknowledge will lead to unusual backtracking conditionals. For
more on this, see the next section.
29
Cf. Perszyk, “Molinism and the Consequence Argument,” 144–146. In fact, the Molinist’s
problem may be worse than this. Dean Zimmerman (“Yet Another Anti-Molinist Argument,”
59–75) has argued that since Molinists take CCFs to be brute (ungrounded), they are committed to the claim that any combination of CCFs might be true, regardless of causal connections or the lack thereof between antecedent and consequent. If Zimmerman is right about
this, then on the Molinist view my decision of what to eat for breakfast may be momentous
indeed, for the Molinist would be committed to the claim that it is both metaphysically and
epistemically possible that if I had decided to eat oatmeal the American president would have freely
decided to order a nuclear first strike and the relevant subordinates would have freely decided to carry
out the order. Note that this is a forward-looking conditional, not a backtracker, but this isn’t
just a “butterfly effect” worry about hidden causal connections: the suggestion is that this
counterfactual connection might obtain as a matter of brute fact despite the lack of any causal
connection. Such conditionals appear to cause very serious problems for free will and moral
responsibility, especially since God knows about and can exploit such connections. (This is
Zimmerman’s point.) My aim in this section is to argue that if Molinism succeeds on its own
terms then it permits prevented options. I will therefore assume that the Molinist can somehow answer Zimmerman’s objections. For one Molinist attempt, see Craig, “Yet Another
Failed Anti-Molinist Argument.”
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strong (counterfactually stable) commitment to ensuring my existence
in particular, so it seems likely that small differences in my choices (or
yours!) might make worlds from which I am absent more choiceworthy
than those in which I am present.
If this is right, then it might be true that if I had chosen to eat oatmeal for
breakfast today, I would have eaten oatmeal for breakfast today and also that if
I had been going to choose to eat oatmeal, I would not have been able to eat oatmeal
(since I would not have existed). Given Molinism, not only are these conditionals consistent, it is epistemically possible that both are true. What
the Molinist must keep in mind is that the first is a forward-looking conditional concerned with what would have followed from my choosing to
eat oatmeal in those circumstances, while the latter is a backtracking conditional concerned with what would have followed from a certain CCF’s
having been (eternally) true.
It might be thought that, even if the forward-looking conditional is true,
the backtracking conditional still prevents the outcome from depending
on my choice in the way required by (b). Again, though, the Molinist had
better figure out a way to avoid this consequence, because the result is
far too general. Since any small change might have led God to choose a
radically different world, these backtracking conditionals might be everywhere. If backtracking conditionals undermine dependence relations it
will not in general be true that effects depend on their causes. Molinism
implies that as long as we are unable to grasp the full basis of God’s decision we can never really know how the world would have been if the
cause had not been going to be present. Nevertheless, the Molinist must
surely maintain, we often know that the effect depends on the cause, and
this often includes knowing that if the cause had not existed the effect
would not have existed.
One strategy for securing this result is to adopt the Leibnizian/
Thomistic view that creaturely causation (whether deterministic or indeterministic) is part of the structure of explanation/dependence within a
world, and God’s decision of which world should be actual does not alter
these internal structures.30 One way or another, though, the Molinist needs
to hold that these backtracking conditionals do not undermine ordinary
dependence relations. The dependence of our actions on our choices is
clearly among these ordinary cases.
On the Molinist view, prevented options are central to the mechanism
of providential control, and it is likely that they are widespread. Probably,
a great many of the choices I face are such that if I had been going to choose
differently, I would never have been faced with this choice, and this is because
God has chosen to prevent me from taking the other course of action.
Note, further, that from the Molinist’s perspective, this is not a bug, it’s a
feature. The entire point of Molinism is to allow God detailed providential
30
Aquinas, Summa Theologica Iq19a8, Iq22, Iq116; Leibniz, Theodicy, §52; Pearce,
“Foundational Grounding.”
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control—including the ability to prevent outcomes God wants to prevent—while preserving libertarian free will. Contingent but prevolitional
CCFs, according to the Molinist, accomplish this.
3. Simple Foreknowledge and Prevented Options
According to Molinism, God has what is sometimes called “simple knowledge” of CCFs, and makes providential use of this knowledge. By “simple knowledge” I mean knowledge that is not based on or derived from
other knowledge. The theological compatibilist, by contrast, might hold
that God’s knowledge of CCFs is derived from God’s knowledge of creaturely natures or essences,31 and so is part of God’s natural knowledge.32
The simple foreknowledge view, as I here understand it, agrees with the
Molinist that CCFs are not part of God’s natural knowledge, but disagrees
with the Molinist by denying that God makes providential use of simple
knowledge of CCFs. Instead, the simple foreknowledge view holds, God’s
natural knowledge is supplemented by simple knowledge of the actual
future. Further, the simple foreknowledge theory holds, such knowledge
meaningfully augments God’s providential control.
The simple foreknowledge view purports to offer more robust creaturely freedom than Molinism, while maintaining a more robust form of
divine providence than open theism. However, like Molinism, the simple
foreknowledge view permits prevented options.
The central difficulty for the simple foreknowledge view is what David
Hunt has dubbed “the Metaphysical Problem.”33 The problem is that God’s
simple knowledge of the future is meant to depend on the future facts. If
God makes providential use of foreknowledge, then God’s choices will
depend on this knowledge. However, these future facts in turn depend
on God’s choices. Hence there is a vicious circularity of metaphysical
dependence.
According to Hunt, the problem is solved if God’s decisions are not
always based on all of God’s knowledge. Each decision must be based on
some portion of God’s total knowledge, and this portion must not include
Leibniz, A Discourse on Metaphysics, §§8–9, 13.
CCFs, for Leibniz, are not strictly speaking part of God’s natural knowledge since
Leibniz insists that they are contingent. However, Leibniz does say that they are part of
God’s “knowledge of simple intelligence,” i.e., the knowledge which “embraces all that is
possible” (Theodicy, §417). Leibniz thus holds, contrary to the Molinist, that God knows the
(allegedly contingent) CCFs in precisely the same way God knows necessary truths. For
discussion of the status of CCFs in Leibniz, and Leibniz’s relation to Molinism, see Griffin,
“Leibniz on God’s Knowledge of Counterfactuals”; Garcia, “Leibniz, a Friend of Molinism.”
For Leibniz’s own characterization of his relation to Molinism, see Theodicy, §§39–48.
33
Hunt, “Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge,” 398. Hunt distinguishes the
Metaphysical Problem from the Doxastic Problem, which alleges that it is not possible for
God to make decisions if God already knows what God will decide. If the Doxastic Problem
is interpreted in such a way as to make it different from the Metaphysical Problem, then it
seems to me to rely on an overly anthropomorphic conception of divine choice. The real problem, at least for the classical theist, is the problem about circular metaphysical dependencies.
31
32

168

Faith and Philosophy

the matter about which God is deciding or anything that logically entails
it.34
To be more precise, let p and q be contingent propositions about the
future. What the Metaphysical Problem shows, according to Hunt, is that
if p entails q then it is incoherent to suppose that God takes p into account
in deciding whether to intervene regarding q. This, however, is a far cry
from rendering simple foreknowledge either incoherent or providentially
useless. In the first place, God need not take p into account in deciding
whether to intervene regarding q: p could be “bracketed” from God’s
decision-making. In the second place, even if p and q are logically independent, p may still be relevant to whether it is desirable that q, and in this
case God can make use of p without generating any circularity.
Hunt illustrates the second case with the following example (among
others):
Sue is a contestant on a game show. God foresees that she will choose Door
#3. [God] therefore manipulates events so that the Grand Prize is placed
behind that door.35

Here we are to imagine God deciding whether to ensure that the Grand
Prize is behind Door #3 and basing this decision on knowledge of which door
Sue will choose. Clearly these two propositions are logically independent.
Of course, since on Hunt’s view God has comprehensive knowledge of the
actual future, God also knows that Sue will choose the door with the Grand
Prize. It would be incoherent to suppose that God makes use of knowledge of this proposition in order to ensure that Sue wins the Grand Prize.
Rather, according to Hunt, God’s knowledge of which door will hold the
Grand Prize is “bracketed” and God only considers which door Sue will
choose. This avoids circularity.
This story clearly generates backtracking conditionals. In order for
this to be an example of providential use of foreknowledge, we need to
assume that God would have acted differently, and the prize would have
been behind a different door, if Sue had not been going to choose Door
#3. Thus, it should be true that if Sue had not been going to choose Door #3,
the Grand Prize would not have been behind Door #3. Note that generating
these kinds of past-to-future dependencies is the entire point of the simple
foreknowledge view, so again this is not a bug, it’s a feature. If the simple
foreknowledge view does not succeed in making some past facts depend
on some future facts, then it is ultimately no different, with respect to
providence, from open theism.36
This backtracking conditional, however, is not yet finkish and does not
generate any prevented options. Suppose, then, that God wants, as on the
Molinist model, to ensure that Sue does not face this choice unless she is going
to choose Door #3. Does the simple foreknowledge theory make this possible?
Hunt, “Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge,” 405–412.
Hunt, “Prescience and Providence,” 437.
36
Zimmerman, “The Providential Usefulness of ‘simple Foreknowledge,’” 192–196.
34
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In fact, the simple foreknowledge theory, as outlined so far, permits
God to do this without overriding Sue’s free will. To accomplish this, God
intervenes regarding whether Sue will be the contestant on the basis of God’s
knowledge of which door the contestant will choose. If the contestant will not
choose Door #3, then God prevents Sue from being the contestant; if the
contestant will choose Door #3, God ensures that Sue is the contestant.
Here, the proposition concerning which God intervenes is Sue will be the
contestant. In deciding whether or how to intervene, God must “bracket”
God’s knowledge of the contestant’s identity. However, God can take into
account another proposition, the contestant will choose Door #3. This proposition does not imply that Sue is the contestant so God can decide to
ensure that Sue is the contestant on the basis of God’s knowledge that the
contestant (whoever that might be) will choose Door #3. This avoids circularity and involves knowledge only of the actual future.
Now, however, we are back in precisely the same case as the Molinist.
Since Sue is in fact the contestant, the rules of the game ensure that if Sue
had chosen Door #2, she would have received the prize behind Door #2. Therefore,
which prize Sue receives depends on Sue’s choice. But God has decided to
ensure that Sue is the contestant if, but only if, the contestant will choose
Door #3. This divine resolution ensures that if Sue had been going to choose
Door #2, she would not have been able to choose a door (since she would not
have been a contestant). Although this is a counterfactual conditional, it is
not an item of divine middle knowledge. It is a consequence of God’s plan
for how to make providential use of simple foreknowledge.
The simple foreknowledge theorist may be inclined to deny that my
case is possible.37 Suppose, then, that the simple foreknowledge theorist
wants to preserve the possibility of Hunt’s original case while rejecting
my modified version. I can see three ways this might go.
In the first place, the simple foreknowledge theorist might argue that
there is some hidden contradiction in my description of the case. This
strategy is, however, not promising. If the notion of divine intervention
makes sense at all (and the simple foreknowledge theorist is committed
to saying that it does) then there is no special problem about God’s intervening to determine whether or not Sue is the contestant. Perhaps, for
instance, the hosts of the game show choose between Sue and Bill by flipping a coin. Then God could certainly manipulate the air currents in the
room to ensure the toss went Sue’s way. Further, the simple foreknowledge theorist cannot object to God’s foreknowing the contestant’s choice,
since this is already part of Hunt’s original case. Finally, the overall story
is that, in the actual world, God ensures that Sue is the contestant and Sue
chooses Door #3. There is no inconsistency here.38
I thank Dean Zimmerman and two anonymous referees for pressing me on this point.
An anonymous referee suggested that this might problematically involve God changing
the actual future, but this is not so. In this story, God affects future events in just the way you
and I do: by acting at a time prior to them. God ensures that Sue is the contestant and, since
37
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Alternatively, then, the simple foreknowledge theorist might argue that
my modified story violates the non-circularity constraint. In particular, one
might worry that what God needs to foreknow in this case is the contestant’s choice, and this is a matter in which one particular, concrete contestant is
involved. Thus, God’s foreknowledge of the contestant’s choice does depend
on the contestant’s identity, and God’s intervention with respect to the contestant’s identity therefore violates the circularity constraint.39 This line of
thought, however, is equivalent to a standard objection to the simple foreknowledge theory which Hunt’s account is specifically designed to avoid.
William Hasker has argued that “if God has simple foreknowledge, he
knows the concrete events of the future, and not merely propositions about
the future.”40 This, however, would render simple foreknowledge useless
because God would then know every detail of every aspect of the event,
including “the entirety of the causally relevant past history of the universe leading up to” the event,41 and God would therefore be unable, without circularity, to intervene regarding any aspect of the event or its causal history.
Hunt’s response is, essentially, to concede that the kind of foreknowledge Hasker describes would indeed be providentially useless if God’s
knowledge of the full detail of each concrete event were an indivisible
whole such that God could not bracket any portion of it. Thus, Hunt suggests, “God intervenes . . . not because of a concrete event, but because
of an abstraction from that event.”42 This is precisely what happens both
in Hunt’s original case of Sue the game show contestant and in my modification of that case: regardless of whether God has the kind of objectual
knowledge of a concrete event Hasker describes, the knowledge God acts
on is propositional knowledge that brackets some of this detail. In Hunt’s
original case, God acts on God’s knowledge of the proposition that Sue will
choose Door #3 and in my case God acts on God’s knowledge of the proposition that the contestant will choose Door #3. In both cases, the non-circularity constraint is satisfied because and only because other aspects of God’s
knowledge of the concrete event the contestant’s choosing is bracketed. If
Hunt’s original case works, then so does my modified version.
Finally, the simple foreknowledge theorist might introduce some new
constraint on providential use of foreknowledge, in addition to Hunt’s
non-circularity constraint. Hunt, after all, never says that the non-circularity constraint introduced to deal with the Metaphysical Problem is the only
limitation on God’s providential use of foreknowledge.
God does so, Sue is in fact the contestant. If the contestant had not been going to choose Door
#3, God would have ensured that Sue was not the contestant and, for this reason, Sue would
not have been the contestant. At least some of the future facts are true because God acts as
God does, and would have been different if God had acted differently. It is only in this sense
that God “changes the future,” and you and I “change the future” in precisely the same way.
39
I thank an anonymous referee for this objection.
40
Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 59.
41
Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 61.
42
Hunt, “Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge,” 404.
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Simple foreknowledge theorists are welcome to invent some well-motivated restriction that rules out my case. To the best of my knowledge, no
such constraint has been proposed in the existing literature. Until such a
proposal comes to light, we must conclude that the simple foreknowledge
theory as so far developed permits prevented options.
4. Prevented Options and Free Will
Both Molinism and the simple foreknowledge theory allow that we may
sometimes have an action among our options although God has decided
to ensure that we do not choose it. Having an action among one’s options,
I suggested above, is necessary but perhaps insufficient for freedom with
respect to that action. It may be thought that the insufficiency is both glaring and highly relevant: I have been arguing, essentially, that options (in
my stipulated sense) need not be robust alternative possibilities. Thus, it
might be thought that theological libertarians should endorse some kind
of alternative possibilities formulation which is stronger than my definition of having an option.
In order to pursue this strategy, the libertarian would need to identify
some way, relevant to freedom, in which agents whose options are prevented differ from us. However, proponents of Molinism or the simple
foreknowledge theory are in no position to do this.
This is most obvious with respect to Molinism. For the Molinist, prevented options are precisely the mechanism by which providence is reconciled with free will: God can work God’s will in the world without
taking away our freedom because God can act to ensure that we are faced
with certain choices only if we will choose as God intends. Such choices,
the Molinist insists, are free.
The case of simple foreknowledge is more difficult. Since the simple
foreknowledge theory is admitted to involve a less robust vision of the
compatibility of providence and creaturely freedom than Molinism, the
simple foreknowledge theorist may be inclined to deny that God can control choices in this way without taking away free will.43 That is, the simple
foreknowledge theorist might claim that although my modified version
of the game show case is possible, in this scenario Sue would not be free.
The trouble with this move is that it essentially amounts to a “bullet-biting” response to the very cleanest kind of Frankfurt case.44 In the actual
world, God does not interfere with Sue in any way at all. Sue’s freedom,
according to this response, is taken away merely by what God would have
done if the contestant had not been going to choose Door #3. Further, the
I thank Dean Zimmerman and an anonymous referee for pressing this objection.
A Frankfurt case is a scenario in which the actual causal sequence looks exactly like
a paradigm case of free and responsible choice, but the agent has no possibility of doing
otherwise. Usually, such cases are constructed by the introduction of a “counterfactual intervener” who would have interfered with the agent’s choice, if necessary, to ensure the desired
outcome, but does not actually intervene. See Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility.”
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simple foreknowledge theorist is explicitly committed to the claim that
God’s decision can be based on direct knowledge of the future—there is
no need for any kind of “tell” in the past or present. As a result, there is
no room for a “flicker of freedom” here. A simple foreknowledge theorist
who wanted to take this line would have to hold that Sue is unfree in the
actual world just because of what would have happened in some counterfactual scenario. Most libertarian responses to Frankfurt cases, including
Hunt’s, have tried to avoid this conclusion. In fact, Hunt’s own response
to Frankfurt cases is to reject the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.45 So
Hunt, at least, is in no position to pursue this strategy.46
It seems, then, that both Molinists and simple foreknowledge theorists
must admit that prevented options do not necessarily take away freedom
or, in other words, that we may sometimes be free with respect to an action
although God has resolved to ensure that we do not choose that action.
We are, in this sense, free to break the laws of providence. How precisely
should we understand this freedom?
In his classic defense of nomological compatibilism,47 David Lewis distinguished three ways in which an agent’s freedom might be thought to
relate to violations of natural law.48 First, it might be thought that there
is some action the agent is free to perform such that if the agent did that
action then there would be a law of nature that was broken. Second, it
might be thought that the agent is free to perform some action such that
the action itself would falsify some proposition that is in fact a law (though
in the world at which this action took place that proposition would not
be a law). Third, it might be thought that the agent is free to perform an
action which is such that, if the agent performed that action there would
be an exception somewhere to a generalization that is in fact a law of nature.
Lewis rejects both the first and second options, but endorses the third:
he holds that the alternative possibilities necessary for freedom are secured
by the existence of possible worlds at which a “divergence miracle” occurs
at some time prior to the choice, allowing the deterministic causal chain to
take a different direction, resulting in a different action.49
Lewis’s rejection of the first option is based on the claim that laws must
be true universal generalizations and it is therefore a contradiction to
Hunt, “Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action.”
In rejecting PAP, Hunt formulates PAP as a principle about moral responsibility, not
a principle about free will. However, Hunt at one point summarizes his position in the
Frankfurt debate as “reject[ing] alternate possibilities while insisting that free and morally
responsible agency is incompatible with causal determinism” (“Moral Responsibility and
Buffered Alternatives,” 145n34, emphasis added).
47
By “nomological compatibilism,” I mean the view that our actions or choices may be
free even if only one action or choice is logically consistent with the actual past and the actual
laws of nature.
48
Lewis, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?”
49
Lewis, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” 114–118. For further discussion of Lewis’s
“local miracle” compatibilism, see Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, §4.2; Beebee, “Local
Miracle Compatibilism”; Oakley, “Defending Lewis’s Local Miracle Compatibilism.”
45
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suppose that any proposition is “both a law and broken.”50 This view about
laws is controversial.51 However, the corresponding claim about laws of
providence is clearly correct: it is a conceptual truth that if an omnipotent
being has decided to prevent an action from being chosen, then that action
is not chosen. Fortunately, none of the views under discussion implies that
we are free to do something such that if we did it God’s will would be
frustrated. The fact that, in the actual world, an option is prevented does
not show that there is no possible world at which it is chosen. However,
any world at which that action is chosen must be a world at which it is not
prevented.
The existence of prevented options does imply freedom to break the
laws in Lewis’s second sense, and not only the third.52 We have been
assuming that God specifically plans for the agent to choose in a particular way, hence a contrary choice is itself a violation of the (actual) laws of
providence. For instance, think of Flint’s papal infallibility case: speaking
falsely (under the relevant circumstances) is an action with respect to which
the Pope is free, although it directly contravenes God’s providential plan.
The conclusion, then, is that Molinists, simple foreknowledge theorists,
and anyone else who thinks that God can sometimes ensure that an agent
makes a particular choice without taking away that agent’s freedom, are
committed to the claim that a prevented option may be an action with
respect to which an agent is free. However, the theological determinist can
also allow for prevented options. Hence, neither the Molinist nor the simple foreknowledge theorist can require alternative possibilities in a sense
that is incompatible with theological determinism.
5. Theism, Sourcehood, and Creaturely Freedom
Proponents of Molinism and the simple foreknowledge theory claim that
theological determinism (that is, total divine control over all contingent
facts) would be inconsistent with creaturely freedom.53 However, they
are committed to the possibility of prevented options, and if prevented
options are possible then free will does not require alternative possibilities in a sense that is incompatible with theological determinism. In other
Lewis, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” 114.
Not only has this claim been disputed by philosophers of religion defending law-breaking miracles (e.g., Swinburne, The Concept of a Miracle), but it has also been disputed by philosophers of science who have argued that it does not accurately capture the role of laws in
scientific practice (e.g., Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie).
52
Perszyk (“Molinism and the Consequence Argument”) argues that Molinists must be
prepared to endorse a strategy similar to Lewis’s, and he suggests that simple foreknowledge theorists might be in the same boat (146, 149n26), but he does not note that the position to which Molinists and simple foreknowledge theorists are committed is in fact more
extreme than Lewis’s. Also see Cohen, “Molinists (Still) Cannot Endorse the Consequence
Argument”; Cunningham, “Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument,” 216–218.
53
Perszyk (“Molinism and Compatibilism”) argues that Molinism is consistent with nomological compatibilism, at least if laws are understood in a descriptive way, but he does not
question the claim that Molinism, by definition, rejects theological compatibilism.
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words, proponents of these theories must hold that freedom with respect
to a particular action is consistent with local theological determinism. That
is, they must hold that particular creaturely actions may sometimes be free
although God ensures that the creature makes this choice and no other.
What sort of conception of free will might permit local theological determinism but not global theological determinism? For anyone familiar with
the free will literature in recent analytic philosophy, there is an obvious
candidate: sourcehood.54
The path for the incompatibilist is not so easy here either, however,
because Leibniz has shown how a theological determinist can provide
sourcehood (what he calls “spontaneity”55) in an extremely strong sense—
stronger than that held by most libertarians. According to Leibniz, the
entire unfolding of a creature’s life arises from its own internal spontaneity.56 This internal law, for a given creature, constitutes its essence or
nature, and makes it the creature that it is. Further, although Leibniz
grounds the modal facts in God,57 he does not hold that God invents
these natures/essences, but rather that God sees that they are possible
and chooses some to be actual.58 Thus on Leibniz’s view although God
chooses every detail of the historical sequence, God is not really involved
in making creatures do things. God is only involved in choosing which
possible creatures are actual.59 In fact, on Leibniz’s metaphysics, nothing
other than the creature’s own nature or essence exercises any influence on
the creature’s actions at all.60 Leibniz’s well-known doctrine of “pre-established harmony,” which obviates the need for any real causal influence
between substances (including agents), is made possible precisely by his
theological determinism, since this is what enables God to ensure that the
substances remain “synchronized” without real causal influence.61 Once
we have turned our focus away from alternative possibilities and toward
sourcehood, it is not difficult to see how Leibniz could boast that “[f]ar
from its being prejudicial, nothing can be more favourable to freedom
than that system [of pre-established harmony].”62
The theological source incompatibilist needs to find some reason for
thinking that no theological determinist model of sourcehood could be
adequate. A first strategy that might be tried is to say that Leibniz’s “internal laws” don’t give rise to action in the right way. Insofar as Leibniz takes
54
Perszyk (“Molinism and the Consequence Argument,” 137–139) frames the disagreement
between Molinists and anti-Molinist libertarians in terms of differing sourcehood intuitions.
55
See, e.g., Leibniz, Theodicy, §§65, 290–291.
56
Leibniz, Theodicy, §§62–65, 400; Leibniz, Monadology, §11.
57
Leibniz, Monadology, §43.
58
Leibniz, Theodicy, §§8–9, 52, 414–417.
59
Leibniz, A Discourse on Metaphysics, §30.
60
Leibniz, Monadology, §7.
61
Leibniz, “Comments on Note L.”
62
Leibniz, Theodicy, §63. For a recent detailed analysis of Leibniz’s understanding of freedom and spontaneity, see Jorati, Leibniz on Causation and Agency. For the theological context
of Leibniz’s account, see Backus, Leibniz, Part II.
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created beings to be “spiritual automata,”63 he is viewing them as some
kind of machines, rather than as reasons-responsive beings.
This, however, is a mistake. The Leibnizian approach could invoke
any kind of psychological laws you like, and in fact Leibniz himself often
refers to the weighing of (real and apparent) reasons and inclinations as
among the things that go into the law.64
The theological source incompatibilist might next object that Leibniz
takes each agent’s internal law to be causally deterministic. Causal source
incompatibilists have presented many arguments for the claim that a
deterministic actual sequence won’t do.65
Causal determinism is, however, not essential to the Leibnizian strategy.
One might well introduce an indeterministic individual law of the series for
each creature. If divine creation is non-causal (and I suggested above that
Molinists might already have reasons for thinking this), then it is conceivable
that God could choose the outcomes of causally indeterministic processes.66
This indeterministic model, however, puts God back in the business
of directly choosing what creatures will freely choose (rather than just
Leibniz, Theodicy, §52.
E.g., Leibniz, Theodicy, §§51, 367.
65
See, e.g., Timpe, Free Will, ch. 9. Arthur Cunningham (“Hasker’s Anti-Molinist
Argument,” 218–220) argues that Molinism should be regarded as a “libertarian” view
provided that the free will it affirms is incompatible with causal determinism. He explicitly argues that the Molinist, though libertarian, can accept the entailment of our actions
by past facts, provided that this entailment does not imply causal determination. Hasker
(“Molinism’s Freedom Problem,” 104–106) replies that causal indeterminism may not secure
alternative possibilities in any sufficiently robust sense. However, the deeper problem for
Cunningham’s defense of Molinism is this: on Cunningham’s view, the Molinist would count
as preserving libertarianism’s “essential commitment” (“Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument,”
219) even if God controlled every detail of history, provided that this control was not causal.
In other words, causal libertarianism does not imply theological libertarianism. As a result,
unless Cunningham can argue that no non-causal mechanism of divine control is possible, he
will lose the central Molinist claim that divine control over the truth values of CCFs would
undermine freedom.
66
Aquinas has often been interpreted as endorsing this kind of view. For the basis in the
primary text, see Aquinas, Summa Theologica Iq22a4. For contemporary scholarly defenses
of this interpretation, see Burrell, Freedom and Creation, ch. 7; Shanley, “Divine Causation”;
Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles, ch. 14. For a notable dissent, see Stump,
Aquinas, chs. 5, 9, and 13. For a recent defense of the combination of theological compatibilism with causal/nomological libertarianism, see McCann, Creation and the Sovereignty of
God. For a recent critique of this view, see Vicens, “Divine Determinism.” Note, however, that
Vicens’s argument is, essentially, that the theological determinist cannot secure alternative
possibilities in any sense more robust than the causal/nomological determinist. I’ve been
arguing that neither the Molinist nor the simple foreknowledge theorist can require alternative possibilities in any sense more robust than the theological determinist can provide.
Hence, if Vicens is correct, then it will follow by transitivity that even the simple foreknowledge theorist cannot consistently claim that nomological determinism would take away the
alternative possibilities needed for free will! We could endorse this argument right down the
line and conclude that believers in divine providence might as well be nomological compatibilists. However, it seems to me that it would be premature to respond in this way prior to a
more thorough investigation into how these views fare with respect to sourcehood.
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choosing which creatures will be actual while knowing what they will
choose, as on the Leibnizian and Molinist models). One strategy, then, is
for the theological source incompatibilist to require both that the causal
sequence be indeterministic and that the creaturely choice not be directly
chosen by God. (Note, however, that considerable weight must be attached
to the word “directly” here in order for this view to be compatible with the
presence of prevented options.)
An alternative strategy would be for the theological source incompatibilist to claim that having the source of one’s actions within one’s essence
or nature is not the right kind of sourcehood for freedom. For instance,
Kevin Timpe suggests that freedom requires the absence of an “externally sufficient” causal chain, and we are to understand this as meaning
external to the person’s “agential structure.”67 Perhaps one’s essence or
nature is external to one’s agential structure in just this problematic way.
Similarly, Robert Kane68 argues that sourcehood adequate for freedom
requires that the agent be “personally responsible” for every “sufficient
ground or cause or explanation” in the chain of grounds/causes/explanations leading up to the action. Again, the incompatibilist might suggest
that Leibnizian agents are not personally responsible for these facts rooted
in their essences.
Note, however, that the Molinist, at least, is in no position to offer these
objections.69 The Molinist’s CCFs must be prior to the person’s agential
structure, since facts about the CCFs figure into the explanation of God’s
decision to actualize a being with that agential structure.70 Furthermore,
Leibniz would say that a free being’s essence/nature/internal law just
is that being’s agential structure (something the Molinist might also be
tempted to say about the CCFs).71 Similarly, with respect to Kane’s account,
the CCFs figure (together with divine choice) into a sufficient explanation
of the agent’s action, and it is hard to see how the agent could be “personally responsible” (in Kane’s incompatibilist sense) for the CCFs.
The simple foreknowledge theorist is committed to the claim that there
are at least some free choices in which the situation is basically the same
as the Molinist scenario. This applies to cases like the modified version of
Sue the game show contestant, who would not have been the contestant if
she had not been going to choose Door #3. Perhaps the simple foreknowledge theorist can get some mileage out of the thought that not all of our
Timpe, Free Will, 138–139.
The Significance of Free Will, 72.
69
Timpe and Kane are not Molinists.
70
This is the central point of Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument.”
71
Note also that the Leibniznian theory satisfies the (putatively libertarian) conditions for
freedom given by Eleonore Stump (“Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative
Possibilities”) even though it endorses causal, nomological, and theological determinism:
on Leibniz’s view the agent’s actions originate in the agent’s essence which is internal to the
agent and the act is ultimately caused by the agent’s cognitive and volitional faculties (“perception” and “appetition,” in Leibniz’s terms).
67
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free choices are like this due to the restrictions placed on God’s use of foreknowledge by the need to avoid circularity. However, it is far from clear
precisely how this story would go, especially given that (we are now supposing) the simple foreknowledge theorist is a source incompatibilist: if Sue
satisfies the sourcehood condition (however that might be spelled out), then
why wouldn’t that condition be satisfied in a world in which every “actual
sequence” leading up to a choice looks like Sue’s in the relevant respects?
The bottom line is this: both the Molinist and the simple foreknowledge theorist are committed to the claim that we may sometimes be free
to break the laws of providence. But if we may be free to break the laws
of providence, then the alternative possibilities required for creaturely
freedom are compatible with theological determinism. Thus, if any hope
remains for combining theological libertarianism with even a moderately
strong doctrine of providence, that hope must be found in sourcehood
considerations. Theological libertarians should begin by identifying a valuable kind of sourcehood they can provide that Leibniz can’t.72
Trinity College Dublin
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